# Highlights

- Epidemiological maps of animal disease are used to manage disease and influence farmer behaviour
- Animal disease maps reflect expert epidemiological knowledge rather than farmers'
- The paper analyses similarities between expert and farmer knowledges of animal disease spread
- Three participatory mapping exercise are used to compare understandings of vulnerability and endemicity
- Farmers' understandings of disease stress the importance of forms of disease mobility
- Findings challenge binary categorisations of animal disease expertise suggesting a more complex relationship.

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     Mapping the Geography of Disease: A Comparison of
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     Epidemiologists' and Field-Level Experts' Disease Maps
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#### 1 **1. Introduction**

2 A common saying amongst veterinarians and epidemiologists is that 3 'disease knows no boundary'. Yet this narrative is frequently by the work veterinarians 4 undermined geographical and 5 epidemiologists undertake in attempting to control animal disease. 6 On the one hand, the national and international governance of animal disease creates spatial zones and boundaries, fixed rules and 7 procedures (Higgins and Dibden, 2011; Enticott and Franklin, 2009). On the 8 other hand, veterinary epidemiologists rely on mapping the incidence 9 of animal disease, its prevalence and spread. Like maps of any other 10 11 risk, these spatial representations of animal disease can have an 12 effect, invoking new policy prescriptions and altering farmers' 13 behaviour.

14 Few social and environmental risks are not calculated and represented in spatial form (Haughton and White, 2018). For Dransch et al. 15 (2010) and Hagemeier-Klose and Wagner (2009), the spatial representation 16 17 of risk in maps has an important role in communicating risk, so long as maps are designed appropriately and match public understandings 18 19 of risk. This focus on 'map effectiveness' (Robinson et al., 1995) is 20 challenged by attempts to reveal the values and power relations embedded within maps (Harley, 1989; Kitchin and Dodge, 2007; Wood, 21 22 1992; Pickles, 2004). Critiques of the map effectiveness model address its reliance on a deficit model of risk communication that assumes 23 supplying the public with more information results in a reduction in 24 risk-taking. Participatory approaches to risk management seek to 25 26 address these problems by addressing the twin challenges of collaboration between experts and local communities, and capacity-27 building by developing and acknowledging new sources of knowledge 28 29 (Maskrey et al., 2019). Thus, uses of participatory mapping seek to 30 reduce the gap between the public and experts (Lane et al., 2011; Brandt et al., 2019), and incorporate and develop new forms of expertise in 31 the planning, management and representation of risks (Cadag and 32

33 Gaillard, 2012; Gaillard and Mercer, 2012; Chambers, 2008). Whilst some question the extent to which participatory approaches to risk 34 mapping produce new forms of knowledge (Haughton et al., 2015), 35 participatory approaches presume that 'non-expert' understandings 36 of risk differ from those of scientific experts. Yet comparisons of 37 38 subjective and objective understandings of risk can show little difference (Wright et al., 2002) with the public demonstrating 39 surprisingly good and nuanced understandings of risk, even if their 40 behaviour suggests otherwise (Davison et al., 1991). 41

42 These issues are highly relevant to the management of infectious animal diseases. Despite the origins of epidemiology in the mapping 43 of public health, there are no critical studies of the way animal health 44 risks are constructed and represented in maps. However, the 45 publication of animal disease risk maps not only represents a method 46 of communicating disease risks, but also a way of encouraging 47 farmers to employ farming practices that keep farms 'disease free'. 48 49 Whilst some research has suggested that farmers develop their own 50 understandings of the spatial transmission of disease (Enticott, 2008), 51 there is no research which examines the extent to which these understanding of disease are different to objectively defined 52 epidemiological calculations contained within disease maps used by 53 policy makers. This has important implications, potentially allowing a 54 broadening of the notion of epidemiological expertise to include 55 56 farmers and field-level veterinarians in order to develop disease maps 57 that are culturally compelling.

The aim of this paper is therefore to examine the extent to which 'official' epidemiological understandings of animal disease risk differ from 'field-level experts', specifically farmers and veterinarians. To do this, the paper draws on a series of participatory disease risk mapping exercises with farmers and veterinarians. The paper describes an attempt to objectively define the spread and endemicity of bovine tuberculosis (bTB) in England and Wales. It then analyses

farmers' and veterinarians definitions of endemicity and compares
these spatial representations of endemic bTB (<u>defined by Thrusfield</u>,
<u>2007</u>: as constantly present in a population ) to those of epidemiological
experts. The policy implications of using disease risk maps to
influence farmer behaviour is discussed in conclusion.

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# 73 **2. Comparing Expert and Non-expert Risk Mapping**

In this section we review existing studies that have sought to reveal 74 75 different spatial imaginations between official or expert accounts, 76 and those of the public and/or field-level experts. Studies from human 77 geography, environmental psychology and sociology frequently point out variations between subjective and objective accounts of risk 78 79 (Rowe and Wright, 2001). For example, disparities between subjective and objective assessments of health are widely recognised (see Baker 80 81 et al., 2004). Explanations of these disparities often rely on the suggestion that population subgroups use different thresholds when 82 83 assessing their health despite having the same level of true health (Lindeboom and van Doorslaer, 2004). 84

85 Others studies point to the significance of lived experience and local knowledge to explain variations in risk assessment. In assessing 86 levels of criminal behaviour, Klinger (1997) and Herbert (1997) suggest 87 88 that police officers, through their day-to-day activities, build a mental map of their beats and the location of high volume crime areas but 89 90 which differ to official crime statistics (Rengert, 1995; Rengert and Pelfrey, 91 1997). For example, Paulsen (2004) found that police officers' perceptions rarely matched mapped official crime data and providing 92 them with official crime maps had little effect on their perceptions 93

94 (see also Ratcliffe and McCullagh, 2001). Paulsen (2004) attributes this
95 limited impact to the failure to involve officers in map-making.

Disparities between objective and subjective risk perceptions may 96 97 also be due to understanding risks at different spatial scales. Nasar and Fisher (1993) suggest that crime hotspots can be understood at 98 macro (i.e. neighbourhood) and micro (i.e. proximate) scales. The 99 significance of proximate features is diluted by mapping at macro 100 101 scales. missing site-specific and situational features. For environmental risks, Cidell (2008) explains how local experience 102 contributes to challenges to noise maps. In this case, residents 103 argued that their local experience of noise was different to that 104 represented by noise contours on maps. In echoes of the map 105 communication model, Hagemeier-Klose and Wagner (2009) note that the 106 107 public's understanding of flood maps depends on the colours used to depict flood risk areas (see also Soane et al., 2010). 108

109 However, despite these studies, public perceptions of risk may not always differ from expert or scientific risk assessments. Rowe and 110 111 Wright (2001) reviewed studies comparing risk assessments by experts and the public, finding no evidence that experts judged risks 112 113 differently to non-experts, or that experts' judgements were in some way more accurate (see also Wright et al., 2002). In studies of public 114 115 health, failure to follow official advice on healthy living may be taken 116 as a sign that the public requires more information on health risks 117 because they do not fully understand the implications of their behaviour. However, this behaviour may disguise compatibility 118 between lay understandings of risk and their official/scientific 119 120 equivalents. For example, Davison et al. (1991) find that whilst official 121 public health advice is rejected by the public, lay theories of illness 122 demonstrate good knowledge of the various risk factors suggested by 123 public health officials.

124 Meanwhile, in studies of environmental risk, Siegrist and Gutscher (2006) compared lay people's risk perceptions of flood risks to experts' flood 125 risk maps. Both the lay and expert views of risk were significantly 126 correlated, even when controlling for experience of flooding (see also 127 Kellens et al., 2011: for similar findings). Some studies have raised 128 129 questions over the reliability of maps created from data contributed 130 by the public (Goodchild and Li, 2012; Goodchild and Glennon, 2010), and questioned the role of these 'citizen science' approaches to data 131 132 collection and surveillance (Galloway et al., 2006; Marzano et al., 2015). Others are less concerned: Linus' law predicts that volume of correct 133 reports cancels out inaccurate data (Haklay et al., 2010). Thus, Spinsanti 134 135 and Ostermann (2013) show how maps of forest fires can be accurately sourced from social media by applying filter criteria to ensure data 136 137 reliability.

138 These studies paint a mixed picture in relation to the similarities between expert and non-expert geographical imaginations of 139 environmental risks. However, they also highlight four inter-related 140 dimensions which also help explain how these differences are created 141 and sustained. Firstly, these studies suggest that the technicalities of 142 143 mapping may contribute to tensions in geographical imaginations. This may refer to aspects of colour and presentation as identified by 144 145 Soane et al (2010). Alternatively, ecological fallacies created by aggregating individual data or using different areal units may 146 contribute to these differences in geographical imagination. 147 Secondly and relatedly, 'lived experience' and local knowledge may 148 149 provide a contextual understanding of risk phenomena, prompting more nuanced rather than distant and universal geographical 150 imaginations (cf. Bickerstaff and Simmons, 2004). Thirdly, as Harley 151 152 (1989) suggests, mapping is political and choices made in producing 153 maps reflect different political positions. Whilst expert maps of risk phenomena may reflect institutional choices, maps that ignore 154 155 contextual or local phenomena may represent attempts to protect

disciplinary boundary (<u>Gieryn, 1983</u>). Finally, following <u>Kitchin and Dodge</u> (2007), it may also be possible that these binary positions breakdown as maps are used in practice. Rather than differences between map users and producers, more nuanced positions may emerge reflecting a more complex engagement between experts and non-experts geographical imaginations.

#### 162 **3. Spatial Measures of Animal Disease Risk**

Whilst comparisons of subjective and objectively defined risks are 163 found across a range of different policy areas, there are no analogous 164 studies of animal disease. The absence of comparisons between 165 those in the field and experts may be attributable to a lack of data 166 about animal health. Data are not systematically collated for many 167 168 endemic diseases because they are private interests and not transmittable between farms. The management of the incidence of 169 170 bovine Tuberculosis (bTB) in England and Wales is one exception. The 171 disease is recognized as one of the most challenging to manage: 172 there is no vaccine and diagnostic tests are compromised by test sensitivity and practicality (Enticott, 2012; Karolemeas et al., 2012). The 173 174 disease can be transmitted between cattle, but also by badgers - the largest wild mammal in the UK and a protected species (Defra, 2014). 175 176 The management of bTB has therefore become dominated by 177 arguments over the impact, efficacy and morality of badger culling 178 (Enticott, 2001; Grant, 2009) Different political parties have taken 179 opposing views on badger culling, resulting in an incoherent and ever-180 changing strategies.

Surveillance of bTB incidence, however, is well established. Cattle herds are tested regularly, and data are stored in a national dataset that is used to analyse annual disease trends at different spatial scales (<u>APHA, 2015; Lawes et al., 2016</u>). Cattle that test positive to the test used to diagnose bTB are known as 'reactors', and a herd incident commonly referred to as a 'breakdown'. Historically, these

187 incidence data were used to set the frequency of cattle testing in parishes - known as the parish testing interval (PTIs) - which were 188 mapped and communicated to farmers (Defra, 2013). For farmers, the 189 190 PTI map came to represent a map of disease risk, demarcating the 191 boundaries of 'clean' and 'dirty' zones, and has been used by policy makers as a means to try to communicate disease risks and 192 193 encourage farmers to adopt biosecurity practices (Enticott and Higgins, 194 2016). However, whilst the PTI map might serve the needs of policy 195 makers, they are not ideal epidemiological zones. They are not of 196 uniform size or shape, and do not account for stocking densities or 197 changes to farm practices such as the use of discontinuous parcels of 198 land.

199 To resolve these issues, the research team developed an objective 200 measurement of the rate of spread of endemic bTB. To do this, surveillance data held by the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) 201 202 were used to describe the location and number of bTB incidents in England and Wales. Data were obtained for the period 1<sup>st</sup> September 203 204 2001 to 31<sup>st</sup> August 2012, and were collated into 24-month intervals. 205 Processing of geographic data and map production was performed 206 using the software ArcGIS 10.0 (ESRI, 2011). The analysis produced two 207 different spatial measurements of bTB: a spatial definition of 208 endemicity, and the rate of spread of the endemic area.

209 A key dimension of these calculations is a threshold for disease 210 proximity and recurrence. Epidemiological calculations of endemicity 211 can be validated by comparing different thresholds to disease incidence in so-called 'Stevenson districts' (Stevenson et al., 2005). In 212 213 this case, two thresholds were set in defining endemicity. The first endemic threshold was the number (*n*) of nearest incidents in order 214 to produce a consistent core endemic area and reduce the influence 215 of isolated cases. The second threshold was the maximum distance 216 (measured in kilometres) of the  $n^{\text{th}}$  nearest bTB incident. Both 217 218 thresholds affect the appearance of the spatial distribution and rate

of spread of bTB when mapped. Following a workshop with veterinarians working for APHA, and epidemiologists responsible for calculating endemicity, the 3<sup>rd</sup> nearest incident was set as the first threshold and its distance threshold was set at 7km and used in subsequent attempts to calculate and map endemic bTB.

224 Figure 1 illustrates the rate of spread of bTB for each 6.25km<sup>2</sup> 225 hexagonal cell that formed the base resolution for the study in the 24-month interval in which spread occurred (anytime between 226 227 September 2001 and August 2012). Rate of spread was calculated as the distance between the endemic areas for 24 month intervals two 228 229 years apart (e.g. September 2003 - August 2005 compared with September 2001 - August 2003), divided by the period of time 230 elapsed (for complete details, see: Brunton et al., 2015). Subsequently, 231 figure 1 was converted to a contour map showing smoothed areas of 232 233 endemicity for each of the 24-month intervals from September 2001 234 until September 2012 (see figure 2).

This method therefore produced an 'official' measure of endemicity 235 and disease spread by the Department for Environment, Food and 236 237 Rural Affairs (Defra), with vulnerable areas categorised as the 'edge' 238 area and areas either side referred to as the High-Risk Area (HRA) or 239 Low-Risk Area (LRA). These spatial categories subsequently 240 influenced policy choices in Defra's bTB eradication strategy (Defra, 2014). However, these thresholds are arbitrary and reflect the 241 242 predispositions of those that choose them, rather than necessarily 243 those who might use the resulting maps. The extent to which the assumptions on which official disease maps rest are the same as 244 245 those amongst farmers or veterinarians who live and work in those areas identified as endemic or experiencing endemic spread is 246 247 untested. As with other risk maps, without multi-stakeholder validation, expertise remains defined as belonging to veterinary 248 scientists, and risks distancing experts from citizens. 249

250 A series of expert opinion workshops (EOWs) was subsequently organized to compare the representations of disease endemicity in 251 252 the disease map with farmers' and veterinarians' perceptions of 253 disease endemicity. By involving farmers and local veterinarians in 254 the EOWs, the purpose was to capture their geographical and 255 occupational expertise thereby reflecting calls for a broader notion of 256 expertise (Landström et al., 2011). Table 1 shows the number of 257 participants in each EOW. Locations of each EOW were chosen to reflect different 'endemic fronts' - specifically a northern and eastern 258 259 front (see figure 1). Participants were selected across the width of 260 these endemic fronts. For example, the Nantwich EOW recruited farmers from the southern verge of the northern endemic front 261 262 whereas the Newark EOW recruited farmers who farmed closer to the outer boundary of the eastern front. Dairy and beef farmers were 263 264 enrolled into the EOWs with the help of local veterinary practices, farming organisations, and snowball sampling. 265



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Figure 1: Map illustrating the hexagons where endemic bTB (defined by the presence of three confirmed bTB incidents incidents within 7km) spread between 2001 and 2012. Rate of spread in km per year is calculated for the two-year time period during which endemic bTB first passed through the hexagon. Hexagons which were classed as endemic prior to 2001 are coloured yellow and are considered to be the 'core' endemic area.

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The EOWs were organised around three participatory mapping exercises (PMEs) and conducted by research team's social scientists (GE and KW). Participatory approaches to mapping are well established in critical cartography studies (<u>Haklay and Tobón, 2003</u>; <u>Elwood, 2002</u>) and rural development (<u>Chambers, 1994</u>). In the first PME, participants were provided with A0 maps of their area and asked to annotate the areas they considered to have endemic bTB. Secondly, 281 participants discussed meanings of endemicity and vulnerability in 282 relation to their annotated maps. Thirdly, participants were presented 283 with maps produced by APHA using different thresholds to calculate endemicity. The thresholds referred to the optimal distance between 284 285 recurrent breakdowns: four threshold maps covering participants' local area were presented (3km, 5km, 7km, and 10km. See figure 2). 286 287 Participants engaged in a consensus exercise to agree which 288 threshold most closely represented the endemic area. Finally, 289 participants took part in another consensus exercise to agree on risk 290 factors for bTB (not reported in this paper). For each activity, participants were split into groups depending on the size of the EOW 291 292 (see table 1).

Table 1: Number of participants in expert opinion workshops.										
Endemi c Front	EOW cod e	Participan ts	Location	No. Participan ts	No. Activity Groups					
Norther n	NF1	Farmers	Knutsford	12	3					
	NF2	Farmers	Nantwich	12	3					
	NF3	Farmers	Wrexham	8	2					
	NV4	Private Veterinarian s	From Cheshire and North Wales	9	2					
Eastern	EF1	Farmers	Melton Mowbray	7	2					
	EF2	Farmers	Market Harborough	6	2					
	EF3	Farmers	Newark	3	2					
	EV4	Private Veterinarian s	From Leicestershire and Nottingham	6	2					

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Ethical approval was provided by Cardiff University's Social Research Ethics Committee, and focus group schedules and activities were approved by the funders (Defra). All participants received information sheets on the aims of the project and provided consent at the start of each group. All EOWs were recorded using separate digital voice recorders for each breakout group. Audio recordings were transcribed and analysed within Nvivo. Participants had not seen the threshold maps prior to the workshops. Participants were not told which threshold had been used when defining the new Edge, HRA and LRA areas, or what other Expert Opinion Workshops had recommended, although the classifications of the Edge, HRA and LRA was publicly available.







309 Figure 2: Maps of endemic bTB with different optimal distance310 thresholds discussed at EOWs.

Due to data protection restrictions, the maps used in the workshops 311 312 or any other spatial representations of bTB (other than the PTI map) 313 such as the location of bTB incidents were not in the public domain. 314 Since conducting the research, Defra have published maps of incidents of bTB on an interactive website (Enticott et al., 2018). 315 316 Moreover, even where veterinary professionals have access to other 317 spatial representations of bTB, their use in practice has been 318 hampered by organisational and practical issues (Enticott and Ward, 319 2020).

# **4. Comparing Animal Disease Risk Maps**

# 321 4.1 Defining 'Endemic' and 'Vulnerable' areas

In each EOW, participants clearly distinguished between *endemic* and *vulnerable* areas. In relation to 'endemicity' wildlife infection and chronic infection of cattle were identified as the two key determinants. Firstly, farmers and veterinarians in either front 326 associated an endemic area with long-standing infection in wildlife 327 moving between cattle and badgers. This indicated a circularity to the spread of disease as opposed to a linear spread: "it's in the wildlife, 328 it's just circulating; it's just going to re-circle" (EF1). The relation of 329 endemicity to wildlife infection was also gualified by farmers' 330 perceptions of non-endemic areas with uninfected 331 wildlife 332 populations. The relation of 'endemicity' to wildlife infection was also 333 prominent in the veterinary EOWs on both the eastern and northern 334 endemic fronts. For example, northern front veterinarians described 335 an endemic area as:

"being in the wildlife population and unable to be eradicated
even if they killed off the cattle in that herd, so if that herd had
TB, and you killed off all the cattle, there was a residual
infection and TB would still be in that area" (NV4)

Veterinarians were also more likely to emphasise the presence of chronically infected cattle as a dimension of endemicity. One veterinarian working within the northern front area discussed the importance of chronic infection as a '*defining marker*' of endemicity stating that '*islands*' of chronic infection could be amalgamated to form what he perceived to be an endemic zone:

346 "[there are] some islands of known chronic infection, but really
347 pretty much you can put them all together and say that's an
348 endemic area as well" (NV4)

Compared to endemicity, vulnerability to bTB involved a greater array 349 350 of factors. Four key signifiers of vulnerability were discussed by 351 participants during the first mapping exercise, including: cattle 352 movements; pockets and hotspots; uncertainty and hearsay; and 353 emergence of 'new' reactors. The identification of cattle movements 354 was most prominent in the northern front EOWs, the role of hearsay and uncertainty was most prominent in the eastern front EOWs and 355 356 the emergence of new reactors was most frequently mentioned

during the veterinary EOWs. The notion of local 'pockets' or 'hotspots'
(and spread from these zones into neighbouring areas) was an
identification of vulnerability in all of the EOWs.

360 For farmers on the northern front, vulnerability was strongly 361 connected to cattle movements in the surrounding area. Referring to 362 their annotated map, one farmer explained what makes an area 363 vulnerable in these terms:

364 "the little orange dots are our farms, the brown circles are 365 where we think it's endemic, but all that area towards [...] is 366 vulnerable just for the amount of places where people take their 367 cattle for summer. Nowhere is really safe we think because the 368 cattle move around so much these days" (NF1)

The perception of vulnerability to bTB infection due to cattle movements links back to perceived definitions of endemicity and its connection to wildlife infection. For example, one farmer in the northern front said:

373 "The only hope is that if cattle moved, it happens when
374 Lancashire cattle move, they find a TB problem and they get on
375 top of it before it gets into wildlife. So there'll always be these
376 little bits of spread into these clean counties" (NF1)

Discussion of vulnerability on the northern front was also assessed in spatial terms, where uninfected land around '*pockets*' and '*hotspots*' were perceived to be particularly susceptible to infection. Farmers referred to '*in-filling*' of previously uninfected land with new bTB cases to reflect how vulnerability existed in 'pockets' of infection. Thus, one north Cheshire farmer highlighted vulnerability in the following terms:

384 "what we think is happening is that you get these hotspot
385 areas and then you get infill between them. So we think that all

this area is very, very vulnerable. It kind of spreads out, pushesout" (NF1)

388 Veterinarians on the northern front also discussed the process of 'infilling' and the identification of vulnerable areas. For example, one 389 390 veterinarian stated: "I mean in the past we used to have two intensive 391 clusters, Congleton, Macclesfield, and then around Whitchurch, and 392 now we've had a lot of infilling" (NF4). Similarly, farmers on the 393 eastern front associated vulnerability with the idea of 'pockets' of 394 infection, annotating them on their maps to show how they were 395 slowly creeping outwards or were connected to cattle movements:

"this area here, up the forest and around here, they're getting
quite a bit of TB... it's not endemic, but we know there's been
pockets sort of here and here" (EF1).

"And here there are little pockets, I know one farm bought in
the cows and went down... it's been a problem here...but
people buy cattle in... I think its purchase yes, but it's not in
wildlife as far as I know, but what I do know, is in the last year
the badger population has just exploded" (EF1).

Local 'hearsay' and rumour was important to these mappings of vulnerability. For example, in Leicestershire one farmer identified vulnerable zones as those where one or two outbreaks were known through local knowledge:

408 "we know of outbreaks around there. But we are not being
409 wiped out by them, I know that one, there is two outbreaks
410 there, one nobody knows where it came from, it was a closed
411 herd, he's about a mile away went down this February but don't
412 know where it has come from, or if they do then they have not
413 said" (EF2)

Though seemingly based on local word-of-mouth these conversationswere often key to farmer's identification of vulnerable zones on the

416 eastern front. The significance of one or two breakdowns in the area
417 was enough to signal the increasing vulnerability of the area to
418 farmers:

419 "there have been some people in the Market Harborough area
420 I think. I know there have been one or two problems there, but
421 really we are not privy to enough information to, but I would
422 say that we're quite vulnerable at the moment "(EF2)

The perception of progression from a vulnerable to an endemic area 423 424 was often based on hearsay from other local farmers. For example 425 one farmer from the north Melton Mowbray EOW stated "a couple of 426 the farms that were shut down, I don't know whether they were 427 positive or... it's not endemic here, but we don't know because Animal Health won't give us any information and I don't believe it's endemic" 428 429 (EF1). This uncertainty of infection and its link to a feeling of vulnerability was also confirmed on the very edge of the eastern front 430 431 where one farmer noted that, "people don't tell you when they're had a TB breakdown unless they're a close friend and you know that 432 they've got a problem" (EF3). 433

By contrast, veterinarians relied on their own knowledge of bTB surveillance data and its technical limitations. Firstly, veterinarians pointed to a gradual build up of disease as reflected through the imperfections of bTB testing. Secondly, veterinarians identified the emergence of 'new' reactors in 'clean' areas as a signifier of vulnerability and the development of vulnerable zones. One veterinarian in the northern EOW explained:

441 "the pattern is usually we get a lot of reactors in a new area
442 and we get no disease. We'll isolate the organism and we don't
443 get visible lesions but as time goes on, although we get more
444 breakdowns like that, eventually you do get disease, you get
445 confirmation, visible lesions, so it usually starts off as reactors,
446 no disease, and then eventually, we get disease" (NV4).

447 The development of an endemic area was perceived to result from the 'creep' of infection into non-endemic areas, subsequently 448 becoming vulnerable areas and eventually endemic areas. The notion 449 450 of 'creep' was discussed in the EOWs as symbolic of the slow but inevitable advancement of endemic TB into their areas: "it's creeping, 451 you look over the past 10 years and you can see this disease moving 452 453 five miles, six miles a year, slowly but surely into what were clean 454 areas, just a slow trickle" (EV4). Veterinarians associated 'creep' with 455 the emergence and increase of inconclusive test results. Similarly, farmers referred to 'sporadic cases' as a marker of vulnerability. 456 457 Farmers meanwhile, particularly on the eastern front, associated 458 'creep' with the movement of badgers into vulnerable areas from the 459 core endemic area.

460 Both farmers and veterinarians pointed to the role of 'hard' boundaries to explain why some areas were vulnerable or had 461 462 become endemic. Hard boundaries most often appeared during the 463 map annotating in the form of major roads, motorways, canals and 464 urban conurbations. For example, Welsh farmers in the northern front EOW identified the A483 road as demarcating 'problem' from 465 endemic areas. Meanwhile, on the eastern front, farmers used the M1 466 motorway to demarcate between levels of bTB risk. The use of hard 467 boundaries to define vulnerability resonated amongst veterinarians 468 469 in each area, for example the northern front veterinary EOW 470 explained when discussing their map: "we're getting a lot of sporadic ones across the whole of Cheshire, I marked on the M56 as a bit of a 471 borderline it's like a corridor I suppose, acts as a bit of a barrier" 472 (NV4). In this instance, hard boundaries were specifically linked to 473 474 wildlife with the network of motorways, the Manchester Ship Canal, and urban sprawl between Manchester and Liverpool defining the 475 geographical possibilities of spread, and which areas were considered 476 vulnerable. 477

478 4.2 Mapping Thresholds

479 EOW participants were presented with the maps shown in figure 2. Across all eight EOWs, the 7km threshold map and the 10km 480 threshold map were each chosen four times. The 3km and 5km maps 481 were never chosen. Both veterinary EOWs chose the 7km map 482 regardless of their regional location. However all three farmer EOWs 483 on the northern front choose the 10km threshold map to most 484 accurately represent endemic spread, whereas only one farmer EOW 485 486 on the eastern front chose the 10km threshold map. The other two farmer EOWs on the eastern front chose the 7km threshold map. All 487 488 EOWs conducted with farmers on the northern endemic front chose the 10km map as that which most closely resembled their perception 489 490 of endemic spread and the vulnerable zone. The consensus in all 491 three farmer northern front EOWs was that the 10km map was the 492 most accurate (see table 2). In other words, farmers tended to think 493 that the endemic area was larger than veterinarians did, or the epidemiologists who had made the maps, or indeed the recent 494 495 definition of the 'Edge' area. In focus groups, these farmers argued 496 that the front had already passed through and the 'real edge' was now further to the East. 497

Nevertheless, the EOWs revealed a wide range of criticism of the 498 499 accuracy of the maps in general, including the 10km threshold map 500 that had been chosen as most accurate. Concern was not at the 501 accuracy of the 10km map at *their* local level. Indeed they chose it as 502 being the most accurate of the maps presented to them. Rather, there was concern about the maps' ability to reflect the endemic 503 status of distant places such as the southwest of England and the 504 importance of representing 'pockets' of enduring non-endemic areas. 505 506 Some farmers thought that the threshold maps, particularly the 10km 507 map but not exclusively, supplied the opportunity and/or danger of 508 'labelling' all farms within these areas as 'endemic'. For example, 509 farmers from the northern front complained that:

510 "there is a danger of using the 10k map, again it tells a story 511 but from what they say and I don't know individually but there 512 are farms in the Southwest that have never had the disease 513 while it's been all around them and spread out" (NF1)

"as I understand it, even within those endemic areas, what's
now called hot spot areas, still there is at least 40% of herds
which have not TB for at least ten years, so they're using
blanket terms to destroy the reputations of everybody in that
area and its time they stopped doing that" (NF2)

519 This particular quote was made in reference the blanket grading of 520 the south west of England as an endemic area on the larger threshold 521 maps (7km, 10km). Another farmer in the EOW reiterated this point 522 by stating "we would all love to know why these certain farms have 523 never been affected even though they're in the middle of Devon, I 524 was talking to a man yesterday and he's surrounded by it and he's 525 not had a case for ten years" (NF2)

These concerns show how a technical definition of endemicity contrasts with farmers' own knowledge of disease and their perceptions of risk at a national level. Indeed, farmers were also concerned that the 10km map could present 'false' zones of endemicity, most notably in isolated areas of the Low Risk Area such as Cumbria in north-west England, which they did not perceive to be endemic. For example they stated:

533 "one of the disadvantages on the 10k map is especially the areas up in Cumbria and North Lancashire, what you've classed 534 535 as endemic on there is isn't necessarily endemic. That's 536 probably movement related cases that have probably been 537 called back. So labelling those is what is classed as an endemic 538 area is probably a bit false whereas the large block down the South Wales, Southwest is an endemic area in the true sense 539 of an endemic area" (NF1) 540

<b>Table 2: Optimal Distance Threshold Choice Agreed at EOWs</b>							
	Participan	<b>Optimal Distance threshold</b>					
	ts	3km	5km	7km	10km		
Eastern Front	Farmers	0	0	2	1		
	Veterinaria	0	0	1	0		
	ns						
Northern	Farmers	0	0	1	3		
Front	Veterinaria	0	0	0	0		
	ns						
All Farmers		0	0	2	4		
All		0	0	2	0		
Veterinarians							

541

542 On the eastern edge two farmer EOWs choose the 7km map as that which most accurately resembled the vulnerable zone and one group 543 chose the 10km map. One group on the eastern edge selected the 544 545 7km map on the basis that the 10km was "probably over stating the 546 case a little" and that the 7km map provided a "more realistic front". 547 The 10km map was not a realistic representation of endemic spread because participants perceived persistent infection in the wildlife 548 549 defined endemicity: "that [10km map] covers a large area and if it 550 were new breakdowns it's not necessarily in the wildlife, it might be 551 in imported cattle, and being dealt with straight away" (EF3). These 552 discussions also revealed a difference between accuracy and the 553 political use of disease maps. Commenting on the difference between 554 thresholds, farmers in Nottingham referred to the 10k threshold being more "scary" than others. This was a point repeated in the veterinary 555 556 EOWs in which it was suggested that 10km map was good "if you 557 wanted to frighten everybody" (NV4).

558 Veterinary EOWs perceived the 7km map to be the most accurate 559 representation of endemic spread. In reference to the other maps, 560 veterinarians from the northern front qualified their choice of 7km by 561 labelling the 3km map "*too conservative*". Veterinarians from the 562 eastern front EOW also perceived the 3km map as unrepresentative

563 and too narrow in its catchment threshold for confirmed breakdowns. Their discussion of this point centred on the spatial distribution of 564 565 cattle farms in the Leicestershire/Nottinghamshire area, explaining that "if you look at that (3km map) then you miss out all the 566 breakdowns that we are getting" (EV4). They were concerned that 567 the lower threshold maps would not accurately represent their region 568 569 due to a lower overall number of farm holdings and therefore a wider 570 spatial distribution if breakdowns in their region (compared to 571 somewhere such as Cheshire).

One concern raised about the use of the threshold maps to visualise 572 573 endemicity was the occasional positioning of farms with chronic TB infection beyond the threshold values (3km, 5km, 7km, 10k). This 574 was presented as a problem in relation to the 7km map in the 575 northern front veterinary EOW. Although choosing the 7km as the 576 577 most accurate of the maps, vets were concerned that "the only thing 578 about that one (7km) is that we have a farm that would lay outside of 579 that red line that's had tb for 10 years just south of the M56 and that 580 farm is obviously a major problem, confirmed reactors every 60 days for 10 years" (NV4). Vets in the eastern edge EOW were also 581 concerned about the situation of some farms outside the threshold. 582 However in their case this was not related to isolated farms with 583 chronic infection but a concern that the spatial distribution of cattle 584 585 farms in the Leicestershire/Nottinghamshire area was more widely dispersed and hence "that (3km map) then you miss out all the 586 breakdowns that we are getting" (EV4). 587

588

#### 589 **5. Discussion**

590 The participatory mapping exercises in each EOW raise five key 591 issues relating to the production and use of risk maps. Firstly, 592 broadening who counts as an epidemiological expert in producing 593 disease risk maps reveals the extent to which different experts' views 594 overlap. Previous analyses of the politics of disease eradication have 595 shown distinct differences between locally situated and distant 596 veterinary experts (Bickerstaff and Simmons, 2004). In this case, however, vets who had real-life working experience within those areas judged 597 598 to be vulnerable to endemic spread agreed with the 7km threshold set by distant epidemiological experts. This does not mean that local 599 600 vets uncritically accepted the maps. A key issue was the accuracy of 601 the maps in avoiding ecological fallacies - for example, ensuring that the risks associated with isolated outbreaks were still nevertheless 602 603 represented. However, the agreement that the 7km threshold was most appropriate can be seen to reflect an (albeit limited) acceptance 604 of the imperfections of mapping. As Christley et al. (2013) point out, 605 606 epidemiological modelling may not be right, but it can nevertheless 607 still be useful. What is interesting, however, is that this critical 608 acceptance is not limited to distant epidemiologists but extends to 609 field-based vets who are usually characterised as dismissive of such 610 veterinary expertise.

611

612 Rather than seeking binary classifications of veterinary expertise, 613 these findings direct more attention to the ways in which different 614 knowledge styles can find ways to accommodate and recombine in an epistemic 'borderland' (Hinchliffe et al., 2016; Enticott, 2017). 615 616 Moreover, whilst there were some differences between veterinarians' and farmers' preferred thresholds, these differences were not large 617 and were in fact similar for 50% of the EOWs. Again, like 618 619 veterinarians, farmers were not uncritical of the technical limitations of mapping. There were also differences in the ways in which farmers 620 621 defined endemic areas, choosing to focus more on the disease in 622 wildlife than in cattle (see below). Nevertheless, the similarity of farmers' choice of thresholds with those of other animal disease 623 experts suggests that rather than looking for simplistic binaries 624 between scientific and lay knowledge, attention is better served by 625 626 examining how the uncertainties of maps are managed in-use. In

doing so, it is possible to see how maps are emergent from the process of mapping. Rather than fixed representations, it is only inuse that the meaning of maps emerges through different practices and interpretations (<u>Kitchin et al., 2013</u>).

631

632 Secondly, discussions about the thresholds of disease maps reveal 633 the extent to which farmers and veterinarians seek to balance 634 different interests. For farmers, ensuring fair representation was central to their recommended thresholds. They sought to balance 635 636 what they thought was an accurate representation of disease whilst 637 preventing those who had not had disease from being unduly labelled 638 as 'dirty'. In seeking this balance, farmers privilege some interests 639 over others. Whilst they recognised the ecological fallacies of 640 mapping in some areas where the disease was widespread, these 641 concerns were heightened where they clashed with their own spatial understandings of disease (cf. Nasar et al., 1993). For example, whilst 642 Cumbria had experienced some recent outbreaks of bTB, these were 643 644 attributed to historical cases arising from cattle movements that 645 falsely labelled the area as endemic. At the same time, farmers and 646 veterinarians recognised the ways in which maps could be used to 647 influence farmers' decisions relating to disease management (see below). Similarly, farmers were also concerned to ensure that their 648 beliefs about the politics of bTB were reflected in these maps. As 649 650 much as they should be accurate, farmers wanted maps to reflect their sense that the management of bTB was out of control and they 651 652 had been badly let down by government (cf. Enticott et al., 2014). Thus, maps of endemic bTB needed to reflect where bTB was endemic in 653 654 wildlife rather than translocated by farmers' trading patterns. Moreover, in the risk assessment exercise that followed the mapping 655 exercises, farmers identified institutional risks (i.e. government 656 657 (in)action) as their biggest threat, rather than cattle, management or wildlife factors. It was in farmers' interests, then, to ensure disease 658 659 maps reflected a negative picture as a way of using the disease map

to justify their demands for additional resources and policies to tackle
bTB, hence their rejection of those maps with lower thresholds. In
short, as critical mapping studies suggest (Elwood, 2002),
democratising the production of maps does not eliminate the politics
of mapping but introduces additional layers of political interests in
the production of maps.

666

667 Thirdly, and related to the last point, the concepts of vulnerability and endemicity had emotional as well as technical thresholds. Disease 668 669 maps therefore both reflected and manipulated human emotions, 670 revealing the different uses disease mapping could be put to. 671 Emotions were integral to farmers' own understandings of disease 672 vulnerability. Their reliance on rumour and hearsay to unpick the local disease environment highlighted their own frustrations with the 673 674 government and agencies responsible for disease control. The emotional dimensions to disease mapping suggest the need for 675 disease management processes to involve farmers in meaningful 676 677 ways if maps and other advice are to be culturally compelling 678 resources for changing farmers' behaviour (Enticott, 2008). 679 Alternatively, these emotional dimensions highlights the political 680 choices that can underscore disease mapping. As some veterinarians 681 suggested, maps could 'scare' farmers into adapting their farming 682 methods, rather than more accurately reflecting the incidence of disease in their area. Whether or not this would be effective given 683 farmers' own understandings of disease is questionable but reflects 684 685 how disease maps can become political tools to change behaviour.

686

Fourthly, the EOWs revealed how the spatial movement of disease was understood differently between veterinarians and farmers. Contoured risk maps are frequently used to map risks, such as flooding. Whilst such debates about contour maps can revolve around their accuracy, the EOWs highlighted how understandings of contours was situated within a spatial understanding of the mobility of disease

693 (cf. Cidell, 2008). Here, two versions of disease mobility, or spread, were described: linear progression and pixellation. Both veterinarians and 694 695 farmers referred to disease spread by referring to 'creep', but this 696 was not seen as a linear encroachment. Rather, participants referred to a more spatially stochastic process in which areas were seeded 697 with infection ahead of an endemic front and backfilled. This 698 pixellated view of disease spread was shared by farmers and 699 700 veterinarians, but for different reasons. Farmers referred to cattle movements, or 'unexplainable' cases involving wildlife, whilst 701 702 veterinarians provided a more technical explanation by referring to 703 the limitations of the bTB testing process.

704

705 These discussions show how different spatial imaginations of mobility are invoked when making sense of risk maps. Moreover, they suggest 706 707 that what is useful in disease mapping is a more general sense of the borderlands of disease spread rather than boundaries. The 708 709 importance of mobility and borderlands may, however, conflict with 710 initiatives with the UK Government's Open Data initiative (Cabinet Office, 2011) to make data on disease incidence publicly available. This 711 712 has resulted in the publication of disease incidence data on publicly 713 available website. Whilst this new way of mapping disease incidence may be helpful to farmers, on its own it risks ignoring the more 714 715 complex understandings of disease risk and mobility articulated by farmers and vets in our research. To capitalize on these knowledges 716 717 and deliver on the challenge of collaboration and knowledge creation 718 common to participatory risk mapping (Maskrey et al., 2019), we argue 719 that these maps need to capture the mobility of disease rather than 720 a snapshot of disease at any given time. This could be achieved by 721 incorporating or overlaying 'risk ranges' rather than risk limits to 722 better reflect farmers' and veterinarians' understandings of disease 723 spread. We therefore suggest that disease maps and spatial categories of disease need should encompass both endemic and 724

vulnerable zones, as well as an overlapping 'creep' zone to highlightthe indeterminate status of this area.

727

728 Finally, these discussions revealed some technical issues relating to 729 map-effectiveness. Rather than the appearance of maps and the use 730 of colour, farmers and veterinarians were more concerned with the 731 accuracy of the data used to construct the maps. A frequent concern 732 among farmers was the perceived lack of use of up to date data. 733 Although the use of data couplets (in two-year sequences) was 734 explained, farmers in all EOWs felt up-to-date data must be available for use when mapping the spread of bTB. For one or two farmers the 735 736 lack of current breakdown data on the maps made them 737 apprehensive about choosing a map among the series which best 738 represented the current situation. Whilst these are important points, 739 they also reflect farmers' levels of trust in government institutions to 740 manage disease

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### 742 **6. Conclusion**

743

744 If maps are important tools for risk management, this paper suggests 745 that broadening the expertise used to produce them may benefit the 746 management of animal disease. The approach adopted in this paper 747 has been to involve field-level experts with on-the-ground knowledge of disease and its local transmission - farmers and local veterinarians 748 749 - in order to contribute to the production of animal disease risk maps. 750 Using participatory mapping exercises, we have shown how farmers 751 and veterinarians understand endemic disease, the factors which 752 make some areas vulnerable and others not, and their understanding 753 of spatial transmission. In doing so, we have shown that these field-754 level experts' understandings of disease – as articulated through 755 different thresholds of disease risk - are not significantly different 756 from veterinary epidemiologists producing maps from a distance. These findings challenge previous binary categorisations of 757

veterinary knowledge, suggesting a more complex overlapping 758 relationship between these different styles of knowledge. This should 759 not legitimise the existing geography of disease map production by 760 761 distant veterinary epidemiologists. Rather, we have shown that an 762 alternative geography of map production involving local and distant 763 experts can have considerable benefits in the creation of risk maps. 764 It might be possible that broadening the expertise used to map 765 animal disease results in greater 'map effectiveness' - an attractive proposition for policy makers seeking to influence farmers' 766 behaviour. However, we conclude by highlighting how this research 767 shows a continued need to understand how maps are used in 768 practice, the mixing of different epistemic perspectives in map use, 769 770 and the political choices taken when creating risk maps.

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